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Qualified Immunity for Executive Officials for Constitutional Violations: Butz v.
Economou '—Arthur N. Economou owned Arthur N. Economou and Co.,
Inc., which was registered with the United States Department of Agriculture
as a commodity futures merchant. 2
 The Department of Agriculture audited
the firm," and then in 1970 filed an administrative complaint which sought to
revoke or suspend Economou's registration for willful failure to maintain the
minimum financial requirements prescribed by the Department. 4 While the
administrative complaint was pending before the Judicial Officer of the De-
partment, 5
 Economou filed a complaint in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York naming as defendants the United States,
the Department of Agriculture, the Commodity Exchange Authority (CEA),
the Secretary and Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, the Judicial Officer, the
Chief Hearing Examiner, several officials of the CEA, the Agriculture De-
partment attorney who prosecuted the enforcement action, and several of the
auditors who had investigated or testified against Economou. 6
' 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
Id. at 481.
3 Id. At the time, the Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 368, § 8, 42 Stat. 1003
(1922), conferred upon the Secretary of Agriculture the power to investigate an ag-
ricultural commodity trading company. This power of investigation has since been
vested in the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 7 U.S.C. § 12 (1976).
438 U.S. at 481. Asa registered futures commission merchant, Economou
was required to maintain a minimum capital balance. 7 U.S.C. § 61(2) (1976). The
regulations setting forth the requisite financial standards are contained in 17 C.F.R. §
1.17 (1976). The disciplinary procedure to he employed against violators of either the
Commodity Exchange Act or the regulations promulgated thereunder are contained in
§ 9 of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1976).
The complaint had first been sustained by the Chief Hearing Examiner of
the Department, whose decision was subsequently affirmed by the Deparunent's Judi-
cial Officer. 438 U.S. at 481. The penalty imposed was a 90 day suspension.
Economou v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 494 F.2d 519, 519 (2d Cir. 1974)
(per curiam). The Secretary had delegated his decisional authority in enforcement
proceedings to the Judicial Officer. 438 U.S. at 481.
Alter an order is issued by the Secretary of Agriculture, the person against whom
such order is directed may seek judicial review in the court of appeals for the circuit in
which he does business. 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1975). Economou did so, and on his petition for
review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that "the essen-
tial finding of willfulness ... was made in a proceeding instituted without the custom-
ary warning letter," which could have led to a correction of the claimed capital insuf-
ficiencies. The court therefore vacated the order of the Judicial Officer. Economou v.
United States Dept. of Agriculture, 494 F.2d 519, 519 (2d Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
" 438 U.S. at 481-82 & nn.2 & 3. With some overlap, the defendants may be
divided into four groups: (I) those officials responsible for initiating the prosecution
(Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, CEA; Act Administrator, CEA; Counsel, United
States Department of Agriculture; Auditor, CEA; Director, Compliance, CEA; Deputy
Directory, Registration and Audit, CEA; New York Administrator, CEA); (2) those
officials responsible for initiating the investigation; (3) those officials responsible for
the audit; and (4) the Chief Hearing Examiner, United States Department of Agricul-
ture. Defendant-Appellees' Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion of Rehearing En
Banc at 10, Economou v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 535 F.2d 688 (2d Cir.
1976),. vacated and remanded, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). The Secretary of Agriculture had no
involvement with the case, having delegated his authority to the Judicial Officer who
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The complaint sought damages for common law torts and violations of
Eco ► omou's constitutional rights,' and an injunction against continuation of
the administrative •proceeding. s Economou alleged that the administrative
complaint had issued improperly and without cause, thereby depriving him of
property without due process." The complaint also alleged that the prosecu-
tion was a retaliatory gesture designed to punish Economou for his previous
severe criticism of the defendants' regulatory operations, and was therefore
violative of the plaintiff's first amendment rights.'" The district court dis-
missed the suit against the individual defendants on the ground that they
were entitled to absolute immunity since the challenged conduct involved
discretionary acts within the outer limits of their authority." The court also
dismissed the claimS against the agency .defendants finding the doctrine of
sovereign immunity a bar to suit."
merely affirmed the decision of the Chief Hearing Examiner. Affidavit of Richard W.
Davis, Jr., attorney, Commodity Exchange Authority, sworn to February 11, 1972,
Economou v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, No. 72-478 (S.D.N.Y. April 20, 1972)
(in opposition to Economou's first motion for a preliminary injunction).
7 An amended complaint referred to in the Supreme Court's opinion alleged
ten causes of action; the first five of which were considered constitutional and the
latter five common law: (1) deprivation of due process since the proceedings were
instituted without proper notice when the plaintiff was no longer subject to the De-
partment's authority; (2) illegal prosecution since, in excess of discretionary authority,
defendants proceeded against Economou when he was no longer subject to the De-
partment's authority; (3) violation of first amendment rights; (4) invasion of privacy
and deprivation of due process since defendants exceeded their authority by making
public the agency complaint without also providing plaintiff's answers; (5) violation of
plaintiff's due process rights by issuance of a false press release; (6) abuse of legal
process; (7) malicious prosecution; (8) invasion of privacy; (9) negligence; and (10)
trespass. 438 U.S. at 482-83 & 11.5.
8 Id. at 481. Two requests for a preliminary injunction were denied by Dis-
trict Court Judge MacMahon. Economou v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, No.
72-478 (S.D.N.Y. April 20, 1972); Economou v. United States Dept. of Agriculture,
No. 72-478 (S.D.N.V. January' 5, 1973). On March 31, 1975, subsequent to a separate
Second Circuit decision vacating the order of the Department of Agriculture's Judicial
Officer, see note 5 supra, Economou filed a second amended complaint which was the
subject matter of this suit. 438 U.S. at 481-82.
" Id. at 482-83. In support of this allegation, Economou stated that his firm
no longer engaged in activities regulated by the defendants; that he was prosecuted
without notice and warning; that he was defamed in a deceptive press release; and that
the defendants made public the administrative complaint without also making available
his answers. Id.
'" hl. at 482.
" k.".conomou v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, No. 72-478, slip op. at 6
(S.D.N.Y. Max' 22, 1975). The district court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
Barr v. Matted, 360 U.S. 564, 565, 572-74 (1959), granting absolute immunity to fed-
eral executive officials performing discretionary acts within the scope of their authority
regardless of motivation. Econontou, slip op. at 2-3 & n.3.
Economou v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, No. 72-478, slip op. at 2
(S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1975). The doctrine of sovereign immunity stales that the govern-
ment cannot be sued in its own courts unless it'has so consented. Although the Federal
Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. V; 2671-2680 (1976), constitutes consent by the United
States to suit in certain cases, the United States has not consented to suit against these
federal agencies in their own name. Ecorromou, slip op. at 2.
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On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
recognized that the district court had correctly applied the doctrine of abso-
lute immunity as it had previously been applied to federal officials."
Nevertheless, the court decided to consider the possibility that absolute im-
munity was not mandatory." The Second Circuit. based its decision to recon-
sider absolute immunity for federal officials on its reading of recent Supreme
Court decisions''' which accorded only a qualified immunity to state executive
officials sued for deprivation of an individual's constitutional rights under sec-
tion 1983." The qualified immunity accorded in these section 1983 cases
protects state officials only when they act in good faith and with reasonable
grounds to believe that their actions are constitutional." The Second Circuit
maintained there should be no distinction between the level of immunity af-
forded state officials in suits brought under section 1983 and that afforded
federal officials in suits brought under the United States Constitution, since
both actions serve the identical purpose of protecting citizens from violations
of their constitutional rights by government officials. 18
 Consequently, it ruled
that federal executive officials were entitled to only qualified immunity for
constitutional violations.' 9
 The court. also determined that none of the de-
fendants' functions were analogous to those of state prosecutors and judges,
who are absolutely immune from section 1983 damages liability, 20 and, ac-
cordingly, that none of the defendants were entitled to the protection of the
absolute immunity granted prosecutors and judges. 21
 Consequently, the Sec-
ond Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Economou's complaint as
to the individual defendants, and remanded the case to the district court for
application of the principles of qualified immunity. 22
13
 EC011011/OU v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 535 F.2d 688, 691 (2d Cir.
1976). 14 
Id.
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232
(1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
1 " 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Section 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proceeding for redress.
" Economou v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 535 F.2d 688, 692-93 (2d
Cir. 1976).
18 Id. at 695 11.7.
19 Id. at 696.
2 " hnbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976) (prosecutor); Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967) (judge).
21
 Ecouomou v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 535 F.2d 688, 696 & n.8
(2d Cir. 1976). The court based this conclusion on the finding that agency actions turn
more on documentary proof than on the veracity of witnesses, and that the defend-
ants' work did not generally involve the same constraints of time and information that
are present in criminal cases. Id. at 696 n.8.
" Id. at 697.
578	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol 20:575
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, 23 and in a five to
four decision HELD; Federal executive officials performing discretionary
functions are entitled only to a qualified immunity for infringements of indi-
viduals' constitutional rights, 24 while federal executive officials performing
judicial and quasi-judicial functions in federal agency proceedings are entitled
to absolute immunity. 25 Justice White, writing for the majority," first noted
the government's contention that all of the federal officials in Butz were abso-
lutely immune even if they had knowingly and deliberately infringed
Economou's constitutional rights. 27 In considering this contention, the major-
ity pointed out the potential conflict between the doctrine of official immunity
and the importance of vindicating constitutional rights. 28 In particular, the
Court cited its recognition in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics 29 of a cause of action under the fourth amendment against
officials who deprive individuals of their constitutional rights." The Court
indicated its belief that clothing federal officials with absolute immunity would
undermine the Bivens cause of action, and noted that circuit court decisions
had unanimously called for qualified immunity.'
The Court next considered whether prior case law mandated absolute
immunity in constitutional cases. In previous decisions, the Supreme Court
accorded federal officials absolute immunity from civil suits so long as they
performed discretionary acts within the scope of their authority. 32 The Court
stated, however, that its holdings in the principal cases of Spalding v. Vilas 33
23
 429 U.S. 1089 (1977).
24
 438 U.S. at 507.
25 Id. at 512-13.
' Id. at 480. Justice White's opinion was joined by justices Blackmun, Powell.
Marshall, and Brennan. Id. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens, Stewart, and
Rehnquist concurred and dissented in an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist. Id. at.
517.
27
 Id. at 485.
28 Id. at 485-86.
29 403 U.S. 388 (1971), In Bivens, the Court held that a violation of the fourth
amendment by federal agents gives rise to a cause of -action for damages resulting
from the unconstitutional conduct. Id. at 397. The Bivens cause of action has been
extended to other constitutional claims, in particular, fifth amendment due process
claims, E.g., United States ex rel. State Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146,
1156-57 (4th Cir. 1974) (fifth amendment); Moore v. Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892, 894 (3i1
Cir. 1972) (fifth amendment); Butler v. United States, 365 F. Stipp. 1035, 1039 (I).
Hawaii 1973) (first amendment).
" 438 U.S. at 485.
31 Id. at 486 & n.9.
" Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572-74 (1959); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S.
483, 498 (1896).
" 161 U.S. 483 (1896). Spalding held that the Postmaster General was not li-
able for an injury resulting from acts performed pursuant to statutory directive, even
if there was a malicious subjective intent. Id. at 498-99. The Postmaster General, in
executing the directives of a statute, had issued a circular among the postmasters,
which was allegedly injurious to the plaintiffs reputation and contractual relationships.
Id. at 484-86.
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and Barr v. Matteo 34 did not. mandate a finding of absolute immunity in all
cases, because those decisions depended on a finding that the officers were
within the scope of their authority.' The Butz Court further noted that alle-
gations that the officer violated statutory or constitutional limits on the scope
of his authority were absent. from Barr and Spalding.'" Thus, the Court
reasoned that although those cases granted absolute immunity to officials per-
forming acts related to the duties of their office, they did not immunize offi-
cials who ignore limitations imposed on their authority by law."' Accordingly,
the Butz Court was "confident that prior cases did not purport. to protect an
official who has not only committed a wrong under local law, but has also
violated those fundamental principles of fairness embodied in the Constitu-
tion." 38
The Court supported its interpretation of Barr and Spalding by reference
to other cases holding that an official is not entitled to absolute immunity
where he transgresses his statutory authority."" The Court look these cases
one step further, reasoning that. "if officers arc accountable when they stray
beyond the plain limits of their statutory authority, it would be incongruous to
hold that they may nevertheless willfully or knowingly violate constitutional
rights without fear of liability."'" Hence, the Court implicitly concluded that
federal executive officials who violate individuals' constitutional rights have
stepped outside the scope of their authority, and are no longer entitled to
absolute immunity.
Having concluded that officials who violate the constitutional rights of
individuals are not entitled to absolute immunity, the Court next considered
what level of immunity is appropriate. In this regard, the Court first consid-
ered cases extending only a qualified immunity to state executive officials
sued under section 1983 for violations of individuals' constitutional rights."'
The Court maintained that this standard of qualified immunity should logi-
34 360 U.S. 564 (1959). Barr held that a definnatory press release, the issuance
of which was clearly within the authority of the Acting Director of the Office of Rent
Stabilization, was not actionable even if issued maliciously, Id. at 574-75.
35 438 U.S. at 489-95.
3 '' Id. at 492-95.
37 hi. at 489 -95.•
39 Id. at 495.
3•  Id. at 490. See Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 209 (1877) (officer who seized
liquor outside of authorized territory liable in conversion); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 170, 179 (1804) (commander of American warship liable for seizure of
another ship when seizure was unauthorized).
4 " 438 U.S. at 495.
41
 hi. at 496-98. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 311, 322 (1975) (school
board members have only a qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit alleging unconstitu-
tional suspension of high school students); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 234-35,
247-48 (1974) (senior state and state university officials have only qualified immunity
in § 1983 suit for unconstitutional suppression of the "Kent State" disturbance); Pier-
son v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 549, 555 (1967) (local police officers have only qualified
immunity in § 1983 suit alleging unconstitutional arrest of black ministers protesting
segregated facilities in a bus station waiting room).
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cally apply to federal officials accused of violating individuals' constitutional
rights, since an action against federal officials under the Constitution is the
equivalent of an action against state officials under section 1983." Justice
White maintained that to create a system where the Bill of Rights monitors
more closely the conduct of state officials than it does that of federal officials
is to 'stand the constitutional design on its head." 43 Accordingly, the Court.
concluded that the standards governing the conduct of federal and state offi-
cials in constitutional cases should be the same.
The Court further reasoned that to accord federal officials absolute im-
munity from liability for constitutional claims would vitiate the Bivens cause of
action." It reasoned that absolute immunity "would seriously erode the pro-
tection provided by basic constitutional guarantees," because plaintiffs would
be unable to obtain relief if all potential defendants had absolute immunity."
In sum, because prior case law did not mandate absolute immunity, because
state executive officials are not absolutely immune, and because of the impor-
tance of vindicating constitutional rights, the Court accorded federal executive
officials only a qualified immunity for infringements of individuals' constitu-
tional rights."
Having concluded that qualified immunity is the general rule for con-
stitutional claims against federal officials, the Court then examined the Sec-
ond Circuit's conclusion that none of the federal officials were entitled to
absolute immunity." The Court stated that the general rule of qualified im-
munity would be subject to exceptions where it could be shown that absolute
immunity is essential for the conduct of the public business." Specifically,
the Butz Court considered the policy of protecting the integrity of the judicial
process by granting absolute immunity to certain participants in a judicial
proceeding to be equally applicable to executive agency officials who perform
similar adjudicatory functions—those who preside over, initiate, or prosecute
an administrative agency proceeding." The Court thus rejected the Second
Circuit's distinction between those officials who perform adjudicatory func-
42 438 U.S. at 500-01.
43
 Id. at 504.
" Id. at 501-04.
45 Id. at 505. No relief would be available from the government because the
Federal Tort Claims Act prohibits recovery for injuries stemming from discretionary
acts, even when that discretion has been abused. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976).
" 438 U.S. at 507.
47 Id. at 508-17.
48 Id. at 507. The Court thus approved a number of its prior decisions holding
judges and quasi-judicial officers absolutely immune from liability because of the im-
portance of their role in the judicial process. Id. at 508-11. See !nailer v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutor); Vaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927), affg mein.,
12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926) (federal prosecutor); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall)
335 (1872) (federal judge). See also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (state judge).
Justice White stated that the high degree of contentiousness in such proceedings and
the need for fearless administration of the law necessitate absolute immunity for judi-
cial and quasi-judicial officers. 438 U.S. at 512.
41
 Id. at 512-17.
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dons in a judicial proceeding and those who perform adjudicatory functions
in an agency proceeding. 5 " Therefore, while denying the defendants' claim
of absolute immunity insofar as it was based on the performance of
discretionary functions, the Court upheld the claim of absolute immunity for
those defendants performing quasi-judicial functions." The Court then re-
manded the case to the Second Circuit for application of these principles to
the remaining defendants. 52
In an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice
Rehnquist, joined by three justices,'" concurred in the majority's holding that
"persons performing adjudicatory functions within a federal agency" are entitled
to absolute immunity, but dissented on four grounds from the holding that
other federal officials who violate the Constitution are entitled to only qual-
ified immunity. 54
 First, the dissent maintained that under prior law the func-
tional scope of the official's authority was the only issue relevant to the ques-
tion of immunity. Contrary to the majority's reacting of prior law, the dissent
stated that an official who acts within the scope of his authority is not reduced
to the protection of only a qualified immunity when he is alleged to have
violated a constitutional right. 55
 In Justice Rehnquist's view, an officer is enti-
tled to absolute immunity "when engaged in the discharge of duties imposed
upon the official by law," even if the action is unconstitutional. 56 Since federal
officials may violate constitutional rights when acting within the scope of their
authority, the dissent concluded that the Court had improperly denied them
absolute immunity. 57
Second, the dissent contended that the absolute immunity rule of Barr
and Spalding is necessary to ensure that federal executive officials conduct
5 ' Id. at 511. See text and notes 21-22 supra.
5 ' Id. at 512-13.
52 Id. at 517. On remand, the district court divided the defendants into three
groups: The first group included those CEA officials who commenced the disciplinary
proceedings against Economou without sending him the customary warning letter. The
claims against them were treated as common law causes of action for malicious pros-
ecution. The court held that Butz created a distinction between common law and con-
stitutional claims, with the latter still governed by absolute immunity. As the officials
were performing discretionary acts within the scope of their authority, the court held
them absolutely immune. The second group included those CEA officials who re-
viewed the audit of Economou's financial records and participated in the decision to
commence disciplinary proceedings against' him. The court held these officials abso-
lutely immune from constitutional tort claims as they were performing the quasi-
judicial functions for which Butz specified there would he an exception from the gen-
eral rule of qualified immunity. The third group included two CEA auditors who
allegedly falsified the results of their audit in an effort to cause commencement of the
CEA proceeding. These officials were held to have only a qualified immunity and to
be potentially liable under an implied right of action for chilling Economou's first
amendment rights. Economou v. Butz, 47 U.S,L.W. 2598. 2602-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
5" 438 U.S. at 517. Justice Rehnquist's opinion was joined by Chief justice
Burger, and justices Stevens and Stewart. Id.
54 Id. at 517-18. (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting).
r's Id. at 520.
5" Id. at 520-21 (quoting Spalding v. Vitas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (189(i)).
57 Id. at 520-22.
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fearlessly the operations of government. 58 Justice Rehnquist stated that this
rule should apply in every case, and maintained that the balance attempted to
be struck by qualified immunity is unworkable in practice. 5• Third, the dis-
sent asserted that even if qualified iminunity is desirable, the Court's opinion
created an illusory distinction between the level of immunity afforded con-
stitutional violations and that afforded common law torts,"" since many com-
mon law claims can be termed a deprivation of due process."' Therefore, the
dissent considered the distinction between common law and constitutional
claims untenable. Lastly, the dissent contended that maintaining a distinction
between federal immunity under the Constitution and state immunity under
section 1983 is logical because Congress evidenced its intent to bring state
officials under its control by passage of section 1983, but had taken no such
action with respect. to federal officials." 2 For these four reasons, Justice
Rehnquist maintained that absolute immunity is a sound rule for damage suits
against federal officials, regardlesss of the nature of the claim."'
The significance of the Butz case is fourfold. First, the majority of federal
executive officials will hereafter enjoy only a qualified immunity when sued
for violations of an individual's constitutional rights." 4 Second, Butz estab-
lishes uniformity between the level of immunity accorded state and federal
executive officials sued for constitutional violations."' Third, the Court po-
tentially redefined the test for applying immunity with respect to constitu-
tional claims, since merely acting within the traditional scope of authority no
longer provides an officer with absolute immunity in this area."" The Court.
did not address the question whether officials are absolutely immune from
liability for common law claims," 7 but rather left that area potentially gov-
erned by absolute immunity. Finally, the Court reaffirmed the principle of
absolute immunity for those officials performing judicial and quasi-judicial
functions, and extended it to officials performing adjudicatory functions
within federal agencies." 8
This casenote will first discuss the doctrines of absolute and qualified
immunity as they existed prior to Butz. This discussion will he followed by a
treatment of the precedential and theoretical problems created by the Butz
decision. The level of immunity properly accorded federal officials in con-
stitutional cases will he analyzed next. It will be submitted that despite the
precedential and theoretical problems, qualified immunity best serves both
public and private interests, subject to the appropriate exception for federal
5 ' Id. at 527-30.
59
 Id.
''" Id. at 522.
61 Id,
"2 IA. at 525-26.
"3 Id. at 530.
61 Id. at 507.
"5 Id. at 500-01. 507.
See text at notes 88-131 infra.
" 7 438 U.S. at 495 n.22.
"8 Id. at 508-17.
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officials performing adjudicatory functions in agency proceedings. Lastly, the
probable distinction between constitutional and common law claims created by
Butz will be discussed and criticized as untenable and unwarranted. It will be
submitted that the Court should move in the future to a general rule of qual-
ified immunity for executive officials in all cases.
I. ABSOLUTE AND QUALIFIED IMMUNITY PRIOR TO Butz
In determining whether the Butz decision is supportable on precedential
and policy grounds, it is important to understand the definitions of absolute
and qualified immunity and the justifications that have traditionally been
urged as support for their application. Prior to Butz, the doctrine of absolute
immunity applied and protected federal officials from liability whenever the
official established that the challenged conduct was a discretionary act"
within the scope of his authority.' Scope of authority was defined as involv-
ing those matters committed by law to the officer's control or supervision. 71
The motivation for the official's conduct. was irrelevant to this inquiry." Two
basic rationales supported the doctrine of absolute immunity for government
officials. The first rationale was that public servants will be hampered and
intimidated unduly in the discharge of their duties if faced with a lawsuit as a
result of harm caused to an individual.'" This rationale holds that the public
official should be able to perform his duties without fear he will later have to
satisfy a jury that he acted in a good faith belief that his action was the best
course of action, and that his action was not the result of an intent to harm
the plaintiff." Accordingly, absolute immunity was viewed as necessary to
promote "the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies of
government." "
19
 Traditionally, the level of immunity available to federal officials for their
actions has depended on whether the challenged conduct is discretionary as opposed
to ministerial. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 132 (4th ed. 1971); Jaffe, Suits Against
Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209, 218-19 (1963). Dis-
cretionary acts involve the exercise of judgment, while ministerial acts cover situations
where the officer's course of action is clearly circumscribed by statute, regulation, or
rule. Accordingly, when performing ministerial functions, the official is required to act
mechanically and in a specific manner. PROSSER, supra, at § 132. Ministerial acts are
accorded no immunity on the premise that when an official has only one possible
course of action open to him under a statute, rule, or regulation, there is no excuse
for a failure to carry out such duties properly. Jaffe, supra, at 218.
7" PROSSER, supra note 69, at § 132.
71 See, e.g., Butz, 438 U.S. at 517 (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting);
Spalding v. Vilas, MI U.S. 483, 498 (1896).
72
 See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959).
73 Barr v. Matted, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579,
581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
74 Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2cl 579, 581 (2t1 Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
949 (1950). In Gregoire, Judge Learned Hand gave the classic formulation of this
rationale for absolute immunity: "Again and again the public interest calls for action
which may turn out to he founded on a mistake, in the face of which an official may
later find himself hard put to it to satisfy a jury of his good faith." Id.
75 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959).
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The second rationale for absolute immunity focused on the injustice,
particularly in the absence of had faith, of subjecting to liability an officer who
is required by the legal obligations of his position, to exercise discretion." 78
This rationale rested on the theory that the officer wronged the plaintiff only
because he exercised his judgment in accordance with his responsibilities as a
public official and not because of any bad faith. 77 Its basic assumption was
that it is better to immunize some officials undeserving of protection than to
subject all officials to the potential uncertainty of a lawsuit, thereby hindering
the conduct of the public business. 78 Absolute immunity before Butz thus
worked to protect an official who has performed discretionary acts within the
scope of his authority on the grounds that the rule was necessary to be fair to
the official and to ensure efficient and decisive government.
Prior to Butz, the Supreme Court had extended absolute immunity to all
federal officials, regardless of rank.'" By contrast, state executive officials
enjoyed only a qualified immunity. 8 " While absolute immunity protected the
federal official whenever he was within the scope of his authority, qualified
immunity set forth two standards which, if demonstrated, would cause the
state officer to lose his immunity. Under qualified immunity, the official lost
his immunity if he failed to satisfy either a subjective test of good faith, or an
objective test of reasonable grounds to believe that his action was justified. 8 '
Qualified immunity was premised on the assumption that society should give
protection only to those officers who have acted properly. 82
 The theory of
qualified immunity therefore rejected the hypothesis that the public interest
requires immunizing undeserving officials in order to protect. those who acted
with good intentions.
In the context of a constitutional claim, such as the claim faced by the
Butz Court, the concept of qualified immunity had a more specifically defined
meaning under prior law. This qualified immunity applied to state executive
officials sued for deprivation of an individual's constitutional rights under sec-
tion 1983. 83
 The defendant officer was presumed to have acted in bad faith
when the constitutional right in question was clearly established. Con-
sequently, in such cases, the official was denied immunity." If the constitu-
tional- right in question was not clearly established, however, the officer could
claim immunity if he proved that he acted in good faith and that he had
7 " Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
" Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1959) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle,
177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950)).
78 Id; 438 U.S. at 530 (Rehn q uist, j., concurring and dissenting).
7" Barr v. Maneo, 360 U.S. 564, 573 (1959).
8" See PROSSER, supra note 69, at	 132. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308
(1975); Schcuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
" Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974).
82 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 588 (Brennan, j., dissenting). Justice Brennan
eloquently argued that absolute immunity extinguishes the wronged individual's in-
terest and runs contrary to the "deep-rooted policy of the common law generally to
provide redress ...." Id.
ea Sec cases at note 80 supra.
84
 Wood v, Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
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reasonable grounds to believe that his action was constitutional. 85 Qualified
immunity thus operated to protect the officer only if he acted in good faith,
did not deprive the plaintiff of a clearly established constitutional right in so
doing, and had a reasonable belief in the constitutionality of his actions." If
these prerequisites were not met, the theory of qualified immunity mandated
that the plaintiff's interest in redress should take precedence over both the
officer's need for protection and society's interest in effective government."
Qualified immunity thus sought to balance the competing interests of redress
for the plaintiff, on the one hand, with those of fairness to the officer and
ensuring the fearless and efficient administration of the public business, on
the other hand.
Consequently, before Butz, absolute immunity protected all federal offi-
cials who performed discretionary acts within the scope of their authority.
Qualified immunity, as enunciated in the context of state officials, recognized
the need to protect both officials and the operations of government by giving
officials more protection from damage actions than any private individual
would have. Nevertheless, the doctrine protected only state officers who had
acted properly. Hence, qualified immunity, by allowing the plaintiff to recover
in some situations, has given some recognition to his interest in redress.
II. PRECEDENTIAL AND THEORETICAL PROBLEMS OF Butz
The Butz Court concluded that qualified immunity is the proper level of
immunity for federal officials who violate individuals' constitutional rights in
the course of performing discretionary functions within the scope of their
authority." Although that decision may be supportable on policy grounds,
the precedential and theoretical underpinnings of the decision are question-
able. These problems arise from the difficulty in reconciling Butz with the
previous two major decisions on federal executive immunity, Spalding v.
Vitas 89 and Barr v. Matte°. 9" Since an application of the principles of these
cases to Butz would mandate a holding of absolute immunity, the Court has
made a change in immunity law. The change appears to be either in the
definition of the traditional prerequisite for immunity—acting within the
scope of authority—or in the level of immunity which is operative when the
official is within the scope of his authority. Consequently, one must examine
pre-Butz definitions of scope of authority and the levels of immunity that
applied when an officer was either within or without that scope in order to
determine which of these concepts Butz has changed. It will be demonstrated
that the Butz Court has not changed the meaning of scope of authority, but
rather has altered the level of immunity that is operative within that scope.
In the 1896 Spalding decision, the Court defined the scope of a federal
official's authority as encompassing any action "having more or less connec-
85 Id.
8" See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
" Barr, 360 U.S. at 588 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88 438 U.S. at 507.
" 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
90 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
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tion with the general matters committed by law to [the officer's] control or
supervision." 9t Spalding involved a suit against the Postmaster General, who
in carrying out the statutory duties of his office had issued a circular among
the postmasters which was allegedly injurious to the plaintiff's reputation and
contractual relationships. 92 The Spalding Court recognized the traditional
rule that an officer acting outside the scope of his authority has no immunity
at al1. 93 The Court found that the Postmaster had acted within the scope of
his authority and held all Cabinet-level federal officials absolutely immune for
acts that fell within that scope. 14 The Spalding immunity doctrine, therefore,
was rather straightforward and gave no indication of any rule other than one
granting absolute immunity when the officer acted within the scope of author-
ity, and denying immunity when he acted outside that scope.
The Supreme Court's 1959 decision in Barr extended the absolute im-
munity rule of Spalding beyond Cabinet-level officials to all members of the
federal executive branch, regardless of rank." Before Barr, lower-level offi-
cials had only qualified immunity." In Barr, the Court held that the Acting
Director of the Office for Rent Stabilization was absolutely immune from suit
on an allegedly defamatory press release which the plaintiff contended was
issued in bad faith. 97 The Court found the press release to be within "the
outer perimeter of the official's line of duty" and "an appropriate exercise of
discretion," thus placing the defendant within the scope of his authority."
Accordingly, the Court felt that absolute immunity was mandatory."
Therefore, after Barr, all federal executive officials performing authorized
acts were absolutely immune from suit. This was true regardless whether their
action caused injury, was a particular type of alleged injury, or was motivated
by bad faith.'" All acts outside the officer's scope of authority were given no
immunity protection. The Barr rule thus was based on the same premise as
Spalding, and merely applied that premise to all federal officials, regardless of
rank. Therefore, after Barr, the Supreme Court left no area where qualified
immunity would apply. In so doing, it sided wholly with the advocates of
" 161 U.S. at 498.
92 Id. at 484-86.
93 Id. at 498. The Court stated that there would be no immunity for acts "man-
ifestly or palpably beyond [the officer's' authority." Id.
9 4 Id.
95 360 U.S. at 573.
96 See, PROSSER, note 69 supra, at § 114.
97
 360 U.S. at 565.
96 Id. at 575. The press release announced the discharge of the plaintiff and
an associate, who together had organized a plait whereby employees of the agency
received annual leave settlements and were returned to agency employment on a tem-
porary basis. This plan was devised on the eve of, and on account of, an uncertain
congressional renewal of the agency's mandate to continue in existence. The press
release allegedly intimated that the two agency employees had devised an immoral
plan which if not violative of the letter of the law, violated its spirit. Id. at 565-68 &
4 & 5.
99 Id. at 575.
10" See PROSSER, note 69 supra, at § 132.
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absolute immunity for all federal officials, rejecting the balancing of interests
inherent in the rationale of qualified immunity.
Under the rule of Spalding and Barr, the Butz district. court appears jus-
tified in its conclusion that all of the Butz defendants were entitled to absolute
immunity. The Secretary of Agriculture and his various subordinates in the
Department of Agriculture and the Commodity Exchange Authority were en-
titled to investigate commodity exchange merchants and to initiate proceed-
ings designed to revoke or suspend the merchants' registrations if the officials
found them to be in violation of the Department's regulations."' The de-
fendants were performing functions intimately connected with the duties of
their offices. Their actions were clearly not unauthorized. Under prior law,
absolute immunity seems to be the mandatory result. Therefore, the Butz
Court has changed either the meaning of scope of authority or the level of
immunity which is operative within it. It will be shown that it has done the
latter.
In holding that certain federal officials would now he entitled only to
qualified immunity, the Butz Court did not claim to be overruling either Barr
or Spalding. Instead, the Court distinguished them by noting that neither case
involved a situation where a statutory or constitutional limit on the officer's
authority was violated. The Court implied that the failure to send Economou
a warning letter violated his statutory rights." 2
 The Court also assumed that
the attempt to suspend Economou's registration violated his constitutional
rights in that it allegedly deprived him of property without due process.'
This statutory and constitutional limitation represents a departure from the
traditional meaning of scope of authority which was defined not from the
point of view whether a constitutional or statutory rule was violated, but from
whether the act, improper or not, illegal or not, unconstitutional or not, was
at all reasonably related to the duties of the office. 104
See 7 U.S.C.
	 12 (1976). This power has since been vested in the Com-
modities Futures Trading Commission. Id.
"2 438 U.S. at 493. The Court's implication of a statutory violation can be
found when it attempts to distinguish Spalding by stating that Spa/ding did not involve
"a mistake of either law or fact in construing or applying a statute." Id. This analysis is
subject to criticism on several grounds. First, since the sending of the warning letter is
merely "customary" not mandatory, no statutory provision was violated by the De-
partment. Economou v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 494 F.2d 519, 519 (2c1 Cir.
1976). The disciplinary procedures of the Department contain no requirement that a
warning letter be sent. See 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1976). However, the fact that such warning
letters were usually sent evidently weighed quite heavily in the Second Circuit's vacat-
ing of the Judicial Officer's order. See Economou v. United States Dept. of' Agricul-
ture, 494 F.2d 519, 519 (1976). Second, even if there were a statutory violation under
prior law, it would not place the defendants outside the scope of their authority. See
Spalding, 161 U.S. at 498. All of these actions still were more or less connected to
general inatters committed by law to the defendants' supervision or control. There-
fore, if the defendants did step outside the scope of their authority, they did so by
allegedly violating Economou's constitutional rights.
"" 438 U.S. at 483.
11" Barr, 360 U.S. at 573-74; see Spalding, 161 U.S. at 498.
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Such a definition of scope of authority is hard to reconcile with Spalding
and Barr. The opinion in Spalding gives no indication that only qualified im-
munity would have been accorded the official had his actions transgressed a
constitutional limitation on his authority.'" Spalding also says that bad faith
will not defeat a claim of absolute immunity.'" Justice Rehnquist is correct
in stating that "Spalding clearly and inescapably stands for the proposition that
high ranking executive officials acting within the outer limits of their author-
ity are absolutely immune from suit."'" In addition, Barr states that when
the defendants act within the scope of their authority they are entitled to
absolute immunity and gives no indication of a different rule for allegedly
unconstitutional acts.'" The defendants in Butz were clearly within the outer
perimeter of their authority to investigate and enforce regulatory sanctions
against commodity futures merchants. An allegation of a deprivation of clue
process or the failure to send the customary warning letter to Economou does
not. place the defendants outside the scope of their authority as that concept
was used in Spalding and Barr. For an officer to he outside the scope of his
authority as that term was defined before Butz, his actions would have to be
completely unrelated to his office.
The Court harmonized its holding in Butz with the precedents of Barr
and Spalding by stating that when an officer violates a constitutional rule he
has overstepped the bounds of his authority. This rationalization raises the
question whether the Court is granting qualified immunity where no immu-
nity existed before. No immunity, qualified or otherwise, has ever been granted
officials who are outside the scope of their authority. 19"1
 The Court certainly
cannot be holding that an official, acting wholly outside the scope of his au-
thority, is granted a qualified instead of no immunity if he violates someone's
constitutional as opposed to common law rights. Such a result would turn the
Court's emphasis on the importance of constitutional rights on its head, and it
is implausible that the Butz Court intended this.
That the Court did not intend to accord executive officials accused of
constitutional violations a qualified immunity when they act outside the scope
of their authority, as it has been defined traditionally, is indicated by its use of
prior case law. The Court's starting point was that immunity was appropriate
when the official acted within the scope of his authority, but that no immunity
"' See Spalding, 161 U.S. at 498-99.
"" Id. at 498. It may he contended that if the cause of action in Spalding is not
viewed as a tort action, but rather as a question of legitimate government activity car-
ried out by an authorized employee, its statement that motive is irrelevant would not
have been a major break from precedents such as Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
87, 99 (1845), which predicated immunity on good faith. However, the effect of Spald-
ing has been to increase the immunity available to public officials, as may he evidenced
by the Court's reliance on Spalding in Barr, 360 U.S. at 570-74. See Engdahl, Immunity
and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. Cow. L. Rev. 1, 51-52 (1972).
107 438 U.S. at 519. (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting).
108 360 U.S. at 575.
1 " Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178-79 (1804); Bates v. Clark, 95
U.S. 204, 209 (1877). See PROSSER, supra note 69, at § 132.
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should be accorded when he is outside that scope. Little v. Barreine,"° decided
in 1804, and Bates v. Clark,'" decided in 1877, clearly set forth the principle
that an official has no immunity when his acts are unauthorized. The Court
used these decisions to support its proposition that the law has never accorded
absolute immunity to federal officials in all contexts."' In both of these
cases, unlike the officials' acts in Butz, the alleged acts did not have "more or
less connection with the general matters committed by law to the officer's
control or supervision," "3 and, therefore, a claim of immunity was unsup-
portable. The Court then referred to the 1845 case of Kendall v. Stokes"' and
the 1849 case of IV//Ices v. Dinsinan "5 to indicate its belief that unauthorized
conduct will not be given any immunity protection.'" In these two cases, the
officers were acting within the scope of their authority and were granted im-
munity."' Since the Court made no effort to distinguish these cases from
Butz and used them to support its refusal to apply absolute immunity, one can
infer that it did not intend to depart from the traditional rule that acting
within the scope of authority is a prerequisite for any immunity, qualified or
absolute.
The conclusion that the Butz Court did not intend a decision which would
grant immunity to officials for previously unprotected action finds further
support in the Court's reliance on the section 1983 cases,"s where defendants
were not performing acts wholly unrelated to their positions.'' 9 Since the
Court relied on these decisions in several respects,"" it is reasonable to as-
"" 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). In Little the commander of an American war-
ship was held strictly liable for seizure of a Danish cargo ship. The authorizing statute
allowed seizure only of ships going to French ports. The President, however, had au-
thorized the seizure of suspected vessels whether going to or from French ports. The
Court held that the President could not expand the scope of the statute, and since the
seized ship was en route from a French port, that the seizure was without authority. Id.
at 176-78.
"' 95 U.S. 204 (1877). In Bates the relevant statute authorized seizure of al-
coholic beverages in Indian country. Since the seizure did not take place in Indian
country, the transporting officer was held strictly liable in conversion. Id. at 205, 209.
"2 438 U.S. at 490.
' 13 Spa/ding, 161 U.S. at 498.
"4 44 U.S. (3 How.) 87 (1845). In Kendall, the Postmaster General was held
immune for a good faith error in judgment in suspending payment to a creditor of
the post office. The Court said that the officer was not liable in damages if he fell into
error provided he "acted from a sense of public duty and without malice." Id. at 99.
'" 48 U.S. (7 How.) 89 (1849). In Wilkes, the commanding officer of a marine
squadron was held immune from liability for illegally detaining a marine beyond the
term of his enlistment. because the error was neither malicious nor willful. Id. at 130-
31.
"" See 438 U.S. at 491-92. The Kendall and Wilkes requirement of good faith
is impossible to reconcile with Spa/ding and Barr. See 438 U.S. at 519 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
" 7
 Kendall, 44 U.S. at 99; Wilkes, 48 U.S. at 130, 131.
"8 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Siheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232
(1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
"9 See note 41 supra.
12"
 438 U.S. at 496-98.
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sume that. it also adopted their assumptions that acting within the scope of
authority is a prerequisite for the qualified immunity accorded officials ac-
cused of constitutional violations therein. Therefore, the Butz Court did not
change either the meaning of scope of authority or the necessity of acting
within it 10 receive any immunity.
Barr and Spalding represent. a policy decision that absolute immunity is
preferable to qualified immunity and should be applied to all federal officials
performing discretionary acts within the scope of their authority."' The Butz
Court, while taking great pains not to overrule Barr,I 2 ' nevertheless applied
qualified immunity 123 in a manner which seems to conflict with the teaching
of Barr. There are two ways to resolve this conflict. One way is to conclude
that since Butz was only dealing with constitutional violations,'" while Barr
was a common law case, the Court also intends to restrict or abolish absolute
immunity for executive officials when they commit common law torts as in
Barr. The Butz Court's treatment of Barr supports such a conclusion. The
Court. indicated that it seriously questions Barr's continuing validity, and it did
everything short of expressly overruling that case. The Court also noted that.
Barr was only a plurality opinion.' 25 It pointed out that Barr did not discuss
whether the defendant's privilege would be defeated by a showing that. he
acted without either good faith or reasonable grounds to believe in the truth
of the allegedly defamatory statement.'" Moreover, the Court noted that the
Barr Court could not have decided the case on the basis of a qualified immu-
nity since the court of appeals had found sufficient. evidence to support an
adverse jury verdict for the defendant on that. question."' The Butz Court
implied, therefore, that the Barr Court wanted to hold the defendant im-
mune, but. was forced into a blanket rule of absolute immunity since the pro-
ceedings below made a judgment for the defendant on the grounds of qual-
ified immunity impossible. Consequently, there is some evidence that the
Court views the controlling scope of Barr as quite narrow, and that it will
move to a general rule of qualified immunity, regardless whether the claim is
constitutional or not, in the future.
A second way to reconcile Butz with Barr is to conclude that the Butz
Court intended to depart from Barr only in the constitutional area. It must
again be noted that the Butz Court did not overrule Barr, but distinguished it
on the basis of an absence therein of a violation of a statutory or constitu-
tional limitation on the officer's authority.'" The Court maintained that Barr
did no more than protect an official who had committed a wrong under local
law as opposed to an official who had violated the Constitution.'" This im-
121 Barr. 360 U.S. at 573, 575; Spalding 161 U.S. at 498.
122 438 U.S. at 488-89 & nn. 10-13. See text at notes 125-28 infra.
12" 438 U.S. at 507.
121 438 U.S. at 495 n.22.
115 Id. at 487.
12" Id. al 488.
127 Id. at 487-88 nn.10 & 13.
125 See 438 U.S. at 489, 495.
12" Irl. at 495.
March 1979]	 CASENOTES
	 591
plies that there can and should be different immunity standards for officials
who violate the Constitution than for those who violate local tort law. Since
tort law is essentially the common law of the states, the Butz Court has proba-
bly not altered the validity of the doctrine of Barr for common law claims.
The Court's emphasis on vindicating constitutional guarantees of individual
rights,'" coupled with its preservation of Barr and Spalding, indicates that it
feels that officials who violate individuals' constitutional rights are entitled to
less immunity protection than those who commit only common law torts.
Hence, absolute immunity is probably still the rule for common law tort
claims brought against federal officials. Accordingly, the better way to har-
monize Butz with Barr and Spalding is to say that the Court has in effect
created a distinction between common law and constitutional claims for pur-
poses of the doctrine of official immunity."'
III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FOR FEDERAL OFFICIALS
PERFORMING NON-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS
Despite the precedential and theoretical difficulties with the Butz Court's
holding, several considerations suggest that the Court's limitation of federal
executive immunity to qualified immunity in the context of constitutional
claims is proper. Before turning to these considerations, it is instructive to
look at the immunity granted state executive officials in suits under section
1983. In granting federal officials only qualified immunity, the Butz Court
applied the standard developed in Scheuer v. Rhodes.' 32
 Scheuer held that state
executive officials sued for constitutional violations under section 1983 1 " are
to have only qualified immunity." 4
 The state officials involved were high-
level state executive officials whose functions were primarily supervisory and
administrative.' 35
 The Court considered the preservation of the section 1983
cause of action to be a compelling reason not to grant state executive officials
absolute immunity in constitutional cases.'" Since the judicial and legislative
13"
 Id. at 501-05.
On remand, the district Court in Butz interpreted the Supreme Court's deci-
sion as creating the common law/constitutional distinction. See note 52 supra.
' 32
 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
133
 For text of § 1983 see note 16 supra.
134 416 U.S. at 247-48. One commentator writing before the Court's decision in
Butz analyzed the effect of Scheuer on the federal level. He pointed out three pos-
sibilities: (I) absolute immunity in all cases except for state officials sued under § 1983;
(2) qualified immunity for both state and federal officials for constitutional claims, and
absolute immunity for common law claims; (3) qualified immunity for all claims on the
stale and federal levels. Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitutional Violations: An
Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 526, 547 (1977). Butz clearly rejects the first
proposition and seems to adopt the second, leaving the door open for a later adoption
of the third.
133 416 U.S. at 234, 247-48. The same standard was applied in Wood v. Strick-
land, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), to local school hoard members sued under § 1983 for
suspending high school students who allegedly violated a school rule prohibiting pos-
session or use of liquor at school functions. Id. at 322.
13"
 416 U.S. at 248. Another rationale behind these rulings was that the breadth
of discretion inherent in the nature of these officials' jobs, unlike that of judicial and
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branches of state governments had already been accorded absolute immunity
for all types of claims," 7 only the executive branch was left. The Court in
Scheuer correctly realized that if state executive officials also were absolutely
immune, section 1983 would be emasculated.'" All potential defendants—all
state officials—would then be immune from suit under section 1983. 1 "
Qualified immunity for state executive officials against constitutional claims
preserves the possibility that some plaintiffs deprived of their constitutional
rights by state officials will be able to recover damages. 19 " Consequently, the
Court found qualified immunity to he the proper level of immunity for state
executive officials sued for constitutional claims. 14 '
The first consideration supporting qualified immunity for federal execu-
tive officials is the preservation of the Bivens cause of action for deprivation of
constitutional rights against federal officers.' 42 This may be favorably com-
pared to the necessity of preserving the section 1983 action against state offi-
cers. Bivens serves the same purpose on the federal level as section 1983 does
on the state level. Section 1983 is a statute designed to protect federal con-
stitutional rights from deprivation by state officials. Bivens holds that such a
right exists implicitly under the Constitution against federal officials.' In
this regard, it must be noted that federal judges and legislators are absolutely
immune from liability for violations of an individual's constitutional or com-
mon law rights."' If federal executive officials were to have absolute immu-
nity for constitutional claims, then all potential defendants—all federal
officials—would he immune from suit. A plaintiff deprived of his constitu-
tional rights by a federal official would have a cause of action, but no one
against whom he could recover. Such a result would vitiate the Bivens cause of
action. 145
 Indeed, several courts of appeals have recognized only qualified
immunity for Federal officials in order to preserve Bivens. 4 ' If all federal
quasi-judicial officers, was not broad enough to require absolute immunity. See. Wood
v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320 (1975) (absolute immunity justified only where neces-
sary for forthright exercise of discretion); Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 243 (nature of an offi-
cial's functions and responsibility affects level of immunity).
" 7
 Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554-55 (judge); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367,
372, 376 (1951) (legislator). Although both of these claims were constitutional in na-
ture, the reasoning and holding clearly apply to common law tort claims as well.
"8 See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 248-49.
I 39 Id.
1411 Id.
' 4 ' Icl. at. 247-48.
'" 403 U.S. at 397.
143
 hl. Bivens was decided in the context of a fourth amendment violation. It has
been extended to other constitutional claims by lower federal courts. See note 29 supra.
The Butz Court implicitly approves this extension. 438 U.S. at 485-86, 501, 504-06.
'" Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 335 (1872) (judge). Federal legislators
are protected by a constitutional grant of immunity. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
145
 438 U.S. at 501.
' 1 ' G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 560 F.2d 1011, 1014-15 (10th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978) (IRS agents); Weir v. Muller, 527 F.2(1 872,
873-74 (5th Cir. 1976) (IRS agents); Black v. United States, 534 F.2d 524, 527 (2c1 Cir.
1976) (IRS director and agents); Jones v. United States, 536 F.2c1 269, 271 (8th Cir.
1976) (members of United States Attorney's office); Mark v. Groff. 521 F.2d 1376,
March 19791	 CASENOTES	 593.
officials were to be absolutely immune from liability for constitutional claims,
the Bivens cause of action would be dead, just as section 1983 would be dead
if state executive officials were to have absolute immunity. Therefore, the
considerations which support qualified immunity for state executive officials
are equally valid in the federal context.
Another consideration supporting qualified immunity for federal execu-
tive officials against constitutional claims is that it creates uniformity between
state and federal levels of immunity. A system where the prohibitions of the
federal Constitution are enforced more stringently against state than federal
officials is anomalous."' The doctrines of federalism may have some validity
in that not all of the dictates of the Constitution's restrictions on the federal
government have to similarly bind the states. However, with regard to those
basic constitutional rights which have been held binding on the states via the
fourteenth amendment, the level of immunity should not differ between fed-
eral and state officials.
A final consideration supporting qualified immunity for federal executive
officials is found in the basic policy objective underlying the doctrine of qual-
ified immunity: to give no less consideration to the plaintiff's right to redress
for the wrong done to him than is necessary to ensure the official's ability to
function. 148 This balance calls for qualified immunity for non judicial execu-
tive officials. 199 A plaintiff's rights are likely to be infringed in normal execu-
tive actions since, unlike judicial officers, most executive officers do not oper-
ate under procedural restraints. 15" In addition, the absence in non-judicial
proceedings of alternative remedies, such as appeals of agency adjudicatory
decisions, further justifies applying qualified immunity. 15 ' The undesirability
of absolute immunity in view of the plaintiff's right to redress is thus more
compelling outside of the judicial context and analogous situations. 152
Contrary to Justice Rehnquist's dissent,' 53 qualified immunity for certain
federal executive officials also presents a feasible standard for both the courts
1380 (9th Cir. 1975) (IRS agents); Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862, 871 (3d Cir. 1975)
(FBI agent); Brubaker v. King, 505 F.2d 534, 537 (7th Cir. 1974); Apton v. Wilson,
506 F.2(1 83, 92-93 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Attorney General, assistants, and police officers);
United States ex rel. State Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146, 1156-57 (4th
Cir. 1974) (Secretary of the Treasury).
147 438 U.S. at 504.
148 See Econornou v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 535 F.2d 688, 692-93
(2r1 Cir. 1976); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232,,243-47 (1974).
14" On the other hand, this balance calls for absolute immunity for judicial and
quasi-judicial officers. Economou v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 535 F.2d at
696. See also Handler & Klein, The Defense of Privilege in Defamation Suits Against Gov-
ernment Executive Officials, 74 HARV. L. REV. 44, 60 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Handler
& Klein].
13" Economou v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 535 F.2d 688, 696 (2d Cir.
1976).
151 The presence of these alternative remedies in the judicial context supports
absolute immunity in those situations. See Handler & Klein, supra note 149, at 60.
'" See Barr, 361) U.S. at 586-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Handler & Klein,
supra note 149, at 60.
I" 438 U.S. at 530 (Rehnquist., J., concurring and dissenting).
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and the officials. The specific standard for qualified immunity laid down in
the section 1983 case of Wood v. Strickland 154 rebuts much of the argument
that qualified immunity will unreasonably impair the official's ability to func-
tion.'" According to Wood, the official will be liable only if he "acted with
such an impermissible motivation or with such disregard of the plaintiff's
clearly established constitutional rights - that his actions cannot reasonably be
characterized as being in good faith."'" This standard provides adequate
security for an official since he will he liable for his wrongdoing only if it was
clearly outrageous or in blatant disregard of a settled constitutional right.' 57
Qualified immunity thus takes into consideration both the officer's need for
protection and the plaintiff's need for redress. 158 Hence, a blanket absolute
immunity for all acts done by executive officials is both unnecessary and un-
just, and the Court's rejection of such a position is commendable.
IV. ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FOR FEDERAL OFFICIALS
PERFORMING ADJUDICATORY FuNcTioNs
Both the majority and the dissent. in Butz agreed that federal agency offi-
cials performing adjudicatory functions are entitled to absolute immunity for
actions within the scope of their authority. This aspect of Butz can best be
analyzed with reference to the considerable amount of protection that has
long been granted officials involved in the judicial process. Absolute immunity
has traditionally been accorded to members of the state and federal judiciary,
and is considered settled law.' 5 • Absolute immunity has also traditionally
been the rule at both the state and federal levels for quasi-judicial officials
such as prosecutors.'" The functional comparability of the judgments of
154 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
155 But see Butz, 438 U.S. at 520 (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting); Gre-
goire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
' 5" 420 U.S. at 322.
157
 For a viewpoint that even the standards of qualified immunity arc too easily
satisfied by officials, See Note, Accountability for Government Misconduct: Limiting Qualified
Immunity and the Good Faith Defense, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 938, 965 (1976).
158 ECCMOMOU v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 535 F.2(1 688, 696 (2d Cir.
1976).
1 " Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349. 355-56 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547, 553-54 (1967). The principle of absolute judicial immunity, inherited from Eng-
land, was first recognized in this country on the federal level in Bradley v. Fisher, 8(1
U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872). Courts have frequently stated that the contentiousness
of litigation, the greater likelihood of frivolous lawsuits arising out of judicial as op-
posed to non-judicial proceedings, and the need to preserve the judiciary's indepen-
dence and decisiveness mandate absolute immunity. Butz, 438 U.S. at 512; Bradley, 80
U.S. at 348-49,
1 " In Yascili v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1926), aff'g mem., 12 F.2d 396, 407 (2d Cir.
1926), the principle of, absolute immunity for the judiciary was extended to federal
prosecutors. This principle was further extended to state prosecutors in Inihler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976). The rationale behind the quasi-judicial absolute
immunity is that the prosecutor's role in the criminal justice system is a sensitive one
and that a qualified immunity would adversely affect his freedom of action—both at
the indictment level in deciding whether to initiate prosecution and at the trial as an
advocate. Id. at 425-27.
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quasi-judicial officers, such as prosecutors, and of judges supports the need
for quasi-judicial absolute immunity."' This traditional common law absolute
immunity for judges and prosecutors has been held to apply to constitutional
claims under section 1983. 1 "2
In determining whether the policy reasons which underlie absolute im-
munity for judges and quasi-judicial officers are equally applicable to partici-
pants in agency proceedings which are wholly quasi-judicial in nature, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Butz found the judicial analogy
inappropriate. The court found that agency officials rely more on documen-
tary proof than on witnesses, and are faced with lesser constraints of time and
information than are their counterparts in judicial proceedings.'" Hence,
the Second Circuit felt. that a qualified immunity was sufficient.'"
In contrast, the Supreme Court held that the balance of the competing
interests of redress and governmental efficiency calls for absolute immunity
for executive officials performing judicial functions in administrative proceed-
ings. 1i 5 The Supreme Court in Butz was careful, however, to apply this stan-
dard only to the Hearing Examiner, the Judicial Officer, those officials who
initiated the actual disciplinary proceeding, and the prosecuting attorney. The
Court remanded the case to the court of appeals to determine the status of
the remaining defendants.'"
The Court's holding that these quasi-judicial officials were entitled to ab-
solute immunity rests on solid ground. The judicial Officer and Hearing
Examiner were clearly performing functions analogous to those of a judge.
When conducting a hearing, they have equivalent powers, are insulated from
political influence, and their decisions are subject to agency and judicial re-
view.'" 7 Those agency officials who initiated the administrative proceeding
are performing a function analogous to that of a prosecutor seeking an in-
dictment. The agency attorney performs a role similar to that of the pros-
ecutor as an advocate at a trial. In light of the settled law on judicial and
quasi-judicial absolute immunity, these defendants clearly were entitled to ab-
solute immunity.
Nevertheless, the same cannot be said of the defendants who initiated the
investigation and the audit, nor of the Secretary and Assistant Secretary' of
"'' Butz, 438 U.S. at 512 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n.20
(1976)).
11'2
 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976) (prosecutor); Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967) (judge).
"" Economou v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 535 F.2d 688, 696 & n.8
(2d Cir. 1976).
"i° Id. at 696.
"' 438 U.S. at 512-13.
"" Id. at 517.
" 7
 The provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559
(1976), provide participants in agency proceedings with many of the safeguards which
are available in the judicial process. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 555 (h) (right to counsel); id. at
554 (d) (independence of hearing examiner): id. at § 556 (c) (power of hearing
examiner to issue subpoenas, rule on evidence, regulate course of proceeding, and
make or recommend decisions).
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Agriculture. These officials did not perform functions analogous to those ac- -
corded absolute immunity in a judicial proceeding. Rather, their functions in
Butz were supervisory and administrative. Absolute immunity for those offi-
cials whose conduct was essentially investigatory " 8 cannot be grounded on a
need to preserve the integrity of the judicial process or its agency equivalents.
It must, however, be noted that the difference between the official action in
deciding to initiate the investigation of Economou and the official action in
deciding to initiate the formal agency prosecution of him is only a matter of
degree. It is conceivable that, on remand, the investigatory officials will also
be granted this quasi-judicial absolute immunity. If quasi-judicial absolute
immunity were to be extended too broadly, however, it could cover virtually
all administrative officials. In that case, the exception in Butz would swallow
up the rule rendering the Court's holding of qualified immunity for constitu-
tional violations mere dicta. While this is a possible development, it is submit-
ted that the Court intended to strictly limit this quasi-judicial absolute immu-
nity to the officials it named or described. It is suggested that the officials who
conducted the audit and the investigation should be denied the quasi-judicial
absolute immunity granted their co-defendants in Butz.'"
V. COMMON LAW/CONSTITUTIONAL. DISTINCTION AFI'ER Butz
The decision in Butz, by subjecting federal executive officials to the same
qualified immunity standard for violations of an individual's constitutional
rights to which their counterparts in state government are held has the bene-
ficial effects of creating uniformity between state and federal immunity and
giving consideration to the plaintiffs right to redress. By not overruling Barr
and by emphasizing that prior absolute immunity rules did not involve con-
stitutional claims, however, the Court in Butz seems to be creating a system
lacking consistency in the standards of immunity applied to constitutional as
opposed to common law claims. This common law/constitutional distinction
has a number of problems that are worth examining. 175
The first problem of the common law/constitutional distinction is an
equitable one. The distinction denigrates the right of redress for common law
" 8
 Investigating officials have only a qualified immunity in section 1983 cases.
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (11167).
"" On remand,'the district court drew no distinction between those officials
who initiated the investigation and those who commenced the agency prosecution. The
group as a whole was held to be absolutely immune on the basis of absolute immunity
either for common law torts or for constitutional claims directed against quasi
-judicial
acts. The court did, however, find two CEA auditors who allegedly falsified their re-
sults to Economou's detriment to have only qualified immunity wider a cause of action
implied front Economou's first amendment claims. See note 52 supra.
"7" The distinction drawn by the Butz Court between common law and constitu-
tional claims for the purpose of official immunity has been attacked as illogical and
undesirable by proponents of both absolute and qualified immunity. See Butz, 438 U.S.
at 522-23 (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting) (favoring absolute immunity for
-
all officials); Granger v. Marek, 583 F.2c1 781. 786-87 (6th Cir. 1978) (Merritt, J., dis-
senting) (favoring qualified immunity for all officials except. judicial and quasi judicial
officers).
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wrongs to a level unworthy of the principles of equity which underlie our
system of justice. Constitutional claims may appear most deserving of the law's
protection, but. surely the Framers did not intend to create an inflexible legal
code containing all of the individual rights they deemed worthy of protec-
t ion. 1 7 1 Our great regard for the Constitution should not lead to a system
where individual rights not enshrined therein are accorded less protection
than rights that are so enumerated. The goal of the law should be to redress
wrongs done whether the cause of action is grounded in the common law or
under the Constitution of the United States.
A second reason why a distinction between common law and constitu-
tional claims is unsupportable is that such a differentiation makes no sense in
light of the functional purposes of the doctrines of either qualified or absolute
immunity. Qualified immunity attempts to give consideration to the plaintiff s
interest in redress by protecting only those officials who act reasonably and in
good faith.' 72 To give this consideration in only one class of cases is illogical.
The right to redress can be just as important in common law as in constitu-
tional cases. It is instructive to note that "the most heinous ammion-law tort.
surely cannot he less important to or have less of au impact on the aggrieved
individual than a mere technical violation of a constitutional proscription." 17"
Since qualified immunity is a desirable rule for equitable reasons, it should
apply in all types of cases.
While qualified immunity is a better general rule than absolute immunity,
because it gives some consideration to the plaintiff's right to redress, it should
be noted that the common law/constitutional distinction is flawed even if one
favors absolute immunity as a general rule. The rationale for absolute immu-
nity is that. it is necessary for the efficient. administration of the public business;
government officials should not have to fear that forthright action, if mis-
taken, will result in a retaliatory lawsuit.' 74 It is unrealistic to believe that offi-
cials will conduct. their affairs differently depending on whether a malicious
or negligent act would give rise to a constitutional or a common law claim.' 75
If the public policy of encouraging the efficient. and fearless administration
of government calls for absolute immunity, it should apply regardless of
whether the claim sounds in tort or under the Constitution. Therefore, if the
official needs the protection of absolute immunity. the nature of the plaintiff's
claim should make no difference. Accordingly, the distinction is untenable in
light. of the underlying functional rationales (If either of the immunity doc-
trines.
In addition to its equitable anti functional shortcomings, the common
law/constitutional distinction also has a practical weakness—many common
' 7 ] See 438 U.S. at 523 (Rehnquist, j.. concurring -
 and dissenting), McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S, (4 Wheaton) 316, 4t)7 (1819).
112 See Barr, 360 U.S. at 586-87 (Brennan, J.. dissenting).
'3 438 U.S. at 523 (Rehnquist. J., concurring and dissenting).
'" Barr, 369 U.S. at 571; Gregoire, 177 F.2d at 581.
' 7 ' See 438 U.S. at 522-23 (Rehnquist. J., concurring and dissenting) (favoring
absolute immunity).
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law claims can be phrased in constitutional terms.'" For example, the situa-
tion in Bivens, 177
 involving a warrantless entry by FBI agents, can be charac-
terized as either a common law trespass claim or as a fourth amendment
unreasonable search and seizure claim. Similarly, many situations can be char-
acterized as deprivations of due process rather than as common law torts where
the alleged wrongdoer is a government official.'" Indeed, Economou was
able to do just that.'" The easy convertibility of common law claims into
constitutional causes of action thus renders unworkable a system where differ-
ent levels of immunity are accorded defendants depending on the nature of
the alleged claim. Indeed, if qualified immunity was recognized in Butz, partly
to preserve the Bivens cause of action,' 8 " deserving claims should not be de-
feated merely because the allegations state the wrong legal norm when the
right one could have been stated. The plaintiff should not have to be so care-
ful in his pleading. This distinction, if rigorously adhered to, would put an
undue emphasis on technical pleading contrary to the spirit of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.'"' It thus appears that the common law/
constitutional distinction has serious equitable, functional, and practical prob-
lems that make adopting it as a crucial part of immunity law an undesirable
result. The law should not stress form over substance.
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Granger v. March,'" the first decision by a
court of appeals on the scope of executive immunity after Butz, illustrates the
problems inherent in a distinction between constitutional and common law
claims. The plaintiff in Granger, a professional preparer of tax returns, al-
"" Granger v. Marek, 583 F.2d 781, 786 (6th Cir. 1978) (Merritt, J., dissent-
ing); Butz, 438 U.S. at 522-23 (Rehnquist., J., concurring and dissenting).
17 403 U.S. at 389. In response to Bivens, Congress amended the Federal Tort
Claims Act to allow suits against the United States for certain intentional torts commit-
ted by federal law enforcement officers. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976). While a plaintiff
now has a statutory right to redress by the government for conduct violative of both
the common law and the fourth amendment., such as trespass, false imprisonment,
assault and battery, the cause of action recognized in Bivens has been extended to
other constitutional claims for which there is now no statutory redress. See note 29
supra and the cases cited therein for the extension of Bivens to other constitutional
claims.
"" 438 U.S. at 522 (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting).
Economou maintained, for example, that the publication of the complaint
and press release—common law defamation—violated his constitutional rights to due
process and privacy. See also 438 U.S. at 484 11.5; Comment, Federal Officials—Scope of
Immunity from Damage Actions Available to Administrative Agency Officials—Economou v.
United Stales Department of Agriculture, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 209, 210 n.8 (1976) (discus-
sing Second Circuit opinion). On remand from the Supreme Court, the district court.
centered only on Economou's claim that the initiation of the proceeding against him
was a retaliatory gesture For his previous outspoken criticism of the agency, thereby
depriving him of his first amendment rights. The court found two defendants poten-
tially liable on this ground. See note 52 supra..
18" See 438 U.S. at 501.
See, e.g., Mitchell v. White Consol., Inc., 177 F.2d 500, 502 (7th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 913 (1951); Faicoori v. Cadais, 147 F.2d 667, 669 (5th Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 742 (1945).
Granger v. Marek, 583 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1978).
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leged that defendant IRS agents engaged in harassing conduct amounting to
tortious interference with her business and intentional infliction of mental dis-
tress.'"" The agents allegedly told plaintiff's customers that: (1) they would
be audited as a result of doing business with her, (2) plaintiff's competitors
charged less and should be employed, and (3) plaintiff was under criminal
investigation.'" The plaintiff allegedly was faced with the destruction of her
business and the loss of her livelihood. Yet, the majority read Butz as calling
for a qualified immunity for constitutional claims only, leaving the defendants
absolutely immune from liability for their common law torts.'" The circuit
court noted that Barr and Spalding were not overruled, but distinguished on
the basis that those cases did not involve constitutional claims. Accordingly,
the Granger majority concluded, the rule of absolute immunity still controls
common law tort actions.' ""
In contrast, the dissent. in Granger maintained that Butz did not create a
rigid distinction between common law and constitutional claims."' The dis-
sent maintained that the reasoning of Butz implied that the choice between
absolute and qualified immunity depended on the role and function of the
official, with qualified immunity as a general rule, subject to exceptions for
officials performing adjudicatory functions.'" It implied that Barr had been
overruled sub silentio. The dissent thus saw many of the weaknesses inherent
in the constitutional/common law distinction.'""
The plaintiff in Granger could have alleged deprivation of property and
her business without clue process, and thereby, under Butz, have relegated the
defendant IRS agents to the protection of only a qualified immunity. Differ-
ences in pleading should not determine substantive outcomes in this way. An
injury worthy of redress should not be left unremedied because it is a com-
mon law as opposed to a constitutional claim. Both types of claims are entitled
to equal consideration. Therefore, the constitutional/common law distinction is
unsupportable on practical, equitable, or functional grounds. It is submitted
that the Supreme Court should overrule Barr v. Malted 1 " and apply qualified
immunity as the general rule for federal executive officials for common law as
well as constitutional claims.
CONCLUSION
Butz v. Economou is a worthy decision which is nevertheless fraught with
analytical inconsistencies. Scope of authority has been redefined to include the
notion of constitutional and statutory constraints on the officer's authority
which, if violated, will potentially limit his protection to that afforded by a
" 3 Id. at 782.
184 Id .
185 Id. at 784.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 786 (Merritt, )., dissenting).
188 hi.
"" Id. at 786-87.
"" 3(10 U.S. 564 (1959).
600	 BOSTON COLLEGE L4W REVIEW 	 [Vol. 20:575
qualified immunity. The decision has implicitly created a distinction between
common law and constitutional claims which will be subject to conflicting in-
terpretations. For the moment, however, absolute immunity remains the rule
for common law torts and qualified immunity is the rule for constitutional
claims. While this distinction has its faults, the Butz decision has two salutary
ramifications. The first is that the level of immunity for federal and stale
executive officials who violate individuals' constitutional rights is now the
same. Second, although only in the constitutional area, the wronged plaintiff's
interest in redress has been placed on par with the societal interest in gov-
ernmental efficiency.
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